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Greece has been hit harder by the financial crisis than any other EU member state, with the economic
fallout threatening to undermine the country’s democratic system. Based on an analysis of political
speeches, Sofia Vasilopoulou, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Theofanis Exadaktylos assess the
response to the crisis by the five parliamentary parties in Greece between 2009 and 2011. They
find that populist rhetoric and blame-shifting has been a key component in the responses of all five
parties.
The global financial crisis has significantly impacted on European economies. In comparison to
other Eurozone countries facing similar external financial pressures, such as Ireland, Portugal and
Spain, Greece has presented the most problematic case, having been often described as the ‘sick
man of Europe’. Why is Greece Europe’s weakest link?
The Greek predicament may not be fully understood without a reference to Greece’s endemic
problems. This is, essentially, the paradox of sustaining a democratic institutional system, while not
progressing beyond the deeply embedded clientelistic and rent-seeking networks that permeate
Greek political culture. The coexistence of these contradictory systemic features during the post-
dictatorship era has facilitated the establishment of what Takis Pappas describes as a ‘populist’
democratic system. This system allowed Greece to develop politically and economically during
periods of international financial stability, but at the same time rendered the country unable to
withstand external shocks.
Our work takes this argument further, by testing the ‘populist’ democratic system theory through the
use of a sophisticated framing analysis of speeches delivered by the leaders of the five parties in
parliament during the 2009–11 period. More specifically, if the theory is correct and populism is a
defining feature of the Greek political system, then it is
likely to be expressed through the narratives of Greek
political actors.
The question that derives from this initial hypothesis is
how this may manifest itself during times of crisis. If
populism is the main justification upon which the system
rests, and crisis opens up political opportunities for
smaller actors in the system, then we may expect that a
populist master narrative is likely to be observed across
the party system. In other words, populism is likely to be
widespread across the political spectrum and is
independent of party ideology.
In order to measure this, the next logical step is to
unpack the concept of ‘populism’ itself. Given that the
term may be understood as a fundamental dichotomy between the ‘blameless us’ and the ‘evil others’, then we
expect that populist rhetoric is likely to be expressed in the forms of blame-shifting and exclusivity.
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Finally, we need to consider whether populism is monolithic or whether its expression involves variation. Given that
Greece has an adversarial and clientelistic political system, and that access to political power has tended to imply
varied access to rents, then we may expect that the rhetoric of blame-shifting populism is likely to differ depending
on the position in the party system, between the mainstream parties that do have access to rents and the fringe
parties that do not.
To test these hypotheses we proceeded with content analysis through which we constructed two indexes. The first is
the blame-shifting index (BSI), which measures the extent to which party leaders’ rhetoric was populist. This is a
simple calculation of party leader negative references to the above categories within each speech, weighed against
the mean length of all speeches by each party leader. The second indicator is an exclusivity index (EI) constructed
per frame, which calculates the proportion of the difference between positive and negative references over the total
references. This index shows the intensity of exclusivity vis-à-vis other groups.
Our empirical testing yielded overall confirming results. Chart 1 below illustrates that parliamentary debates across
the party system were characterised by a severe penetration of populist frames. All five party leaders engaged in a
practice of populist blame-shifting, albeit to varying extents and in different forms. As expected, mainstream blame-
shifting, employed by the two major parties, is a more concentrated form of populism. Blame is directed against
fewer actors, concentrating upon the major contenders in the system: that is, each other as the two main parties
competing for government, and external elites. Fringe blame-shifting, employed by the smaller parties, is a less
concentrated form of populism entailing that blame is spread out, and directed against a wider range of actors
including the party of government, the party of opposition, external elites, specific interest groups and the
collaboration between them.
Chart 1: Breakdown of Party Leaders’ BSI Scores per Frame
Note: Each bar represents the extent to which a party directed blame at the targets shown in
the key on the right-hand side. This is measured on the blame-shifting index (BSI) shown in
the vertical axis. The main Greek parties are the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK),
New Democracy (ND), the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the Popular Orthodox Rally
(LAOS), and the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA).
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In Chart 2 below we combine the mean BSI and EI scores according to party ideological positions. Blame-shifting is
visualised in terms of the size of the bubbles: the bigger the bubble, the greater the extent of blame-shifting in party
leader speeches. The position on the vertical axis represents each party leader’s mean EI scores. We placed the
five parties on the horizontal left–right axis based on an expert survey of Greek political parties that took place in
2011.
Chart 2: Party mean BSI and EI Scores located on a left–right dimension (2009–11)
Note: The size of the bubble indicates the extent to which each party engaged in blame-
shifting (a larger bubble indicates more blame-shifting). The left-right scale shows the party’s
position (with a score of 0 being extreme-left and 10 being extreme-right). The Exclusivity
index shows how negative or positive speeches were overall (a negative value shows a party
articulated more negative statements than positive ones).
Overall, the findings from the mean BSI and EI scores show that both mainstream and fringe party leaders engaged
in an iterative blame-shifting game, revealing their common willingness to divert political accountability. In this way,
they shifted the focus from a specific debate over what type of reform was needed in order to successfully manage
the crisis, to who was to blame for the crisis.
The crisis presented Greek party leaders with a catch-22 situation. On the one hand, these actors were subjected to
substantial international pressures for implementing reform, but on the other hand, structural reform would inevitably
lead them to compromise their position within the political system. Essentially, the need to provide successful
solutions to what is primarily an economic problem with international dimensions, presented Greek actors with a
political dilemma: how to implement fast and effective structural change, while not compromising their own position
in the status quo. The answer: by diverting political accountability through populist blame-shifting rhetoric. Given the
development of a populist democracy in the post-dictatorhsip era, this is unsurprising and the most likely option
available to Greek political actors.
3/4
The full article will appear in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Issue 52, Volume 2 in March and is available
for an early view here.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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